From Lab to Fleet: Building and Deploying a Practical Rowhammer Defense in Cloud SoCs
- Stefan Saroiu ,
- Sujay Yadalam ,
- Alec Wolman ,
- Will Remaklus ,
- Daniel S. Berger ,
- Isaac H. Luna ,
- Ishwar Agarwal ,
- Jay Lorch
International Symposium on Computer Architecture |
Rowhammer attacks pose a significant threat to modern DRAM, with potentially serious security consequences for a cloud vendor, such as data corruption or infrastructure outages. Existing defenses fail to satisfy key industry requirements, including minimal overhead in the absence of attacks, predictable performance when under attack, system liveness, low hardware cost, adaptability to diverse hardware configurations, and tunable security guarantees.
This paper introduces Sigries, a hybrid Rowhammer defense implemented by Microsoft in the Azure Cobalt 200 SoC, combining the Misra-Gries algorithm for efficient row tracking with a fallback row-sampling mode for robustness under all attack scenarios. Sigries’s design meets all our performance goals and offers configurable security guarantees allowing a cloud vendor to assess the security risks to its fleet. Our trace-driven evaluation shows that Sigries maintains minimal DRAM bandwidth overhead while keeping performance overhead consistently low. This work represents the first detailed description of a fully implemented, industry-grade Rowhammer defense and provides insights to inform research prototypes about real-world requirements.